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Why do Farmers Spend Different Amounts of Transaction Costs 
in Agri-Environmental Schemes? 
Abstract 
Agri-environmental schemes provide payments for farmers in return for environmental 
services. Implementation induces transaction costs (TCs). Borne by farmers (private TCs), 
their amount may inhibit participation. Research shows substantial variances in private TCs 
within single schemes, which are largely unexplained to date. Furthermore, no distinction has 
yet been made in research whether farmers spent TCs due to scheme-prescribed tasks, or 
voluntarily  to  achieve  „transaction  gains.‟  This  might  be  an  important  factor  in  farmers‟ 
perceptions of TCs. The overall aim of this analysis is to explain within-scheme TC variances. 
TCs  are  defined  functionally  as  “costs  of  participation.”  The  variance  in  TC  spending  is 
assumed to represent a different willingness to participate due to underlying motives. This is 
tested by ANOVAs and Pearson‟s correlations with the example of a German AES. Results 
show that all assumed motives are significant but differ along the implementation process and 
imply that different functions have TCs. Thus, general public reimbursement of private TCs, 
as allowed in current EU regulations, might therefore be inappropriate. 
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1.  Introduction 
One of the major objectives of the European Union‟s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
on  rural  development  as  stated  in  Regulation  EC  1698/2005  is,  “Farmers  and  other  land 
managers [shall be encouraged] to serve society as a whole by introducing or continuing to 
apply agricultural production methods compatible with the protection and improvement of the 
environment, the landscape and its features, natural resources, the soil, and genetic diversity” 
(Art. 35). This aim is pursued via publicly provided „Agro-Environmental Schemes‟ (AES). 
AES can be seen as a contractual mechanism for the transaction of environmental goods or 
services between the farmer/seller and the agricultural authority as representative consumer 
(Mettepenningen et al., 2009). AES offer payments to farmers in return for committing to 
carry out agr-environmental measures above mandatory standards on a voluntary basis. 
Implementing  AES  involves  transaction  costs  (TCs),  which  are  broadly  defined  as 
“scheme organisational costs” (Falconer et al., 2001:84). The expense of TCs is necessary at 
different stages of the implementation process: as (1) search and information costs to find an 
adequate transaction partner; (2) bargaining and decision costs if agreements on the terms of 
participation are required, and (3) policing, monitoring, and enforcement costs to make sure 
that each contract party complies with the agreement (Dahlman, 1979). While the first two are 
referred to as ex ante costs (prior to formal agreement), the latter are referred to as ex post 
costs (McCann et al., 2005). As an important cost component, researchers‟ and politicians‟ 
interest  in  upcoming  TCs  grew  (Falconer  and  Whitby,  1999;  Vatn,  2002).  In  empirical 
research,  TCs  were  found  to  amount  up  to  70%  on  average,  (e.g.  Rørstad  et  al.,  2007; 
Falconer et al., 2001). Previous research shows substantial variances in TCs borne by farmers 
(private TCs), as well as between different AES (Vatn, 2002; Rørstad et al., 2007, Falconer 
and Saunders, 2002), and within single schemes (Rørstad et al., 2007, Beckmann et al., 2003). 
TC variances between schemes are explained by the classical assumptions of Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE), stating the attributes of the transaction and the governance mode as 
determining factors (Williamson, 1985). Farm and farmer characteristics, which are likely to 
be  an  explanation  for  within-scheme  variances  have  been  not  investigated  in  depth. 
Furthermore,  private TCs  may  prevent  farmers  from  participation,  as  they  reduce the net 
payment  (Falconer,  2000).  This  was  taken  up  by  policy;  in  the  current  regulation  EC 
1698/2005, one is allowed to add a TC compensation payment for farmers into the calculation 2 
of payments up to 20% (Art. 39). However, to date no distinction has been made in research 
whether farmers‟ TCs have to be spent compulsorily, induced by scheme-prescribed tasks, or 
spent voluntarily in order to achieve „transaction gains‟ This might be an important factor in 
farmers‟ perception of the amount of TCs. 
This analysis considers both aspects; the overall aim of this paper is to explain within-
scheme, private TC variances. TC spending is perceived in a functional way; TCs serve to 
overcome information gaps and are intentionally spent on resources in terms of time and 
money by the farmers according to their individual motives (Weber and Nuppenau, 2010). 
Thus TCs are defined as a monetary expression of voluntary and compulsory tasks conducted 
by farmers. In order to check for external influences, analysis is done within one scheme, 
implemented  in  one  region.  The  AES  „site-specific  grassland  extensification‟  within  the 
institutional surroundings of the state of Hesse, Germany, serves as an example. TCs are 
measured  directly  for  each  contract  in  a  process-related  approach.  Results  show  that  the 
decision by farmers to spend money on TCs stems from several motives and varies along the 
transaction process. It is also shown that voluntary TCs are incurred to pursue particular aims. 
By that, variances in private TCs are shown to be the result of different underlying motives 
(aims). Thus a general reimbursement of farmers‟ TCs might not be reasonable. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: After a presentation of the scheme particulars 
(Section 2), previous findings on farmers‟ TCs are presented in Section 3. The theoretical 
background  for  analysis  and  testable  hypotheses  are  elaborated  in  Section  4.  Section  5 
describes the methodology. Results are presented in Section 6 and discussed in Section 7. 
This is followed by a short conclusion. 
2.  The Site-Specific Grassland Extensification Scheme 
2.1 Political Frame 
The site-specific grassland extensification scheme (SSGES) aims to preserve ecologically 
valuable grassland habitats (HMULV, 2006). Closing down cattle farms in such areas, but 
also intensification to increase yield in productive areas lead to a loss of grassland, which in 
turn causes the loss of environmental and ecological benefits such as water pollution control, 
erosion and habitat protection. The scheme was established to secure the typical small-section 
land use and to prevent land from being abandoned (HMULV, 2006). Priority on participation 
is given to farmers managing habitats specified by the EU-Habitats‟ Directive, but an eligible 
area  can  also  be  protected  by  nature  protection  laws,  as  long  as  it  is  approved  as  being 
ecologically valuable. Grassland specified by the Habitats‟ Directive covers about 41,000 ha 
in Hesse. 
Since  2007,  all  Hessian  AES  are  implemented  under  the  framework  of  the  Hessian 
Integrated Agri-Environmental Programme. All AES are based on a management contract 
between  a  farmer  and  a  county  agricultural  administration  (CAA).  The  SSGES  takes  the 
largest share of the budget as well as the highest intended number of participants (HMULV, 
2006). 
2.2 Scheme Details 
The sites to be put in the contract are mainly selected by the CAA based on the ecological 
value of the site habitat represented by an amount of points, but farmers can make suggestions 
and/or reject the suggested sites. The contract period is five years. Farmers have to apply 
formally for participation. The application is checked for formal correctness, and if the sites 
are approved as applied for, contract details can be specified. Contract terms include basic 
prescriptions  such  as  prohibition  of  grassland  conversion,  of  using  chemical  or  synthetic 
pesticides, and of surface irrigation or melioration. Farmers are obligated to use the contracted 
area  agriculturally  at  least  once  per  year;  a  second  use  (mowing  or  grazing)  may  be 
compulsory  due  to  habitat  characteristics.  Farmers  can  choose  between  a  grazing  and  a 3 
mowing agreement. The main obligation in the mowing agreement is the prescription of a 
fixed (usually late) date for first mowing and the removal of the swath. The main obligation in 
the grazing agreement is a prescribed cattle density and often a prescribed (comparatively 
late) date for first grazing and often additional mowing. Farmers have to keep a detailed field 
log and, in case of a grazing agreement, a pasturing log. Furthermore, they have to allow 
inspection visits to the farm. The calculation of payments made for each type of agreement is 
based on estimated opportunity costs for participating farmers (HMULV, 2009). The basic 
annual  payment  is  110  €/ha  for  the  mowing  agreement  and  200  €/ha  for  the  grazing 
agreement. If the contract area is located in a nature protection area, the farmer is paid an 
individually calculated payment of 200€/ha according to the legally based use restrictions. 
Farmers have to apply annually for the payment. The amount of premiums was adopted from 
a range suggested by the federal agricultural ministry as an average compensation needed for 
losses  in  income  and  extra  costs  (HMULV,  2009).  Taking  this  range  as  a  reference,  the 
Hessian  payment  is  at  the  lower  end.  Beside  the  basic  premium,  further  compensation 
payments (“ecologically valuable special services,” EVSS) can be agreed upon. EVSS are 
based on presumed extra effort  due to  specificities  of the contracted area,  such as slope, 
wetness, or difficult accessibility. They can be specified in 3 steps of intensity, linked to 3 
steps  in  additional  payment.  Payments  for  EVSS  are  also  calculated  as  an  average 
compensation. A total payment of 360€/ha/year must not be exceeded. Double funding is 
strictly  prohibited;  farmers  participating  in  the  organic  farming  scheme  only  receive  the 
difference between the extensification and the organic scheme payment for contracted plots. 
3.  Previous Findings 
The following overview focuses on studies with approaches similar to the one of this 
analysis. The first process-oriented calculation of single farm/farmer TCs in AES delivery 
was  made  within  the  STEWPOL  project  (Huylenbroeck  and  Whitby,  1999).  Within  that 
project,  the most important  work, which shaped researchers‟ perception on the effects  of 
private TCs, is given by Falconer (2000). She states that both actual and perceived TCs matter 
in  decision-making  on  participation  and  that  the  amount  of  TCs  may  keep  farmers  from 
scheme participation. Comparing seven case studies on various AES in Europe, she fnd that 
private transaction costs of scheme participation (related mostly to registration) amount to 
several hundred Euros per farm per year. Private TCs amount to ~ 5% of the compensation 
payments made to farmers on average, although with a wide range. Organic aid schemes are 
expected to be more expensive for farmers (closer to 10% of typical compensation payments). 
Many TCs were found to be fixed, so a proportionately larger burden is borne by smaller 
farms. However, no distinction is made between voluntary and compulsory TCs. 
Falconer  and  Saunders  (2002)  compare  private  TCs  in  a  highly  site-specific  and 
standardised management agreement approach, similar to the AES used in this analysis. They 
were the first to estimate TCs by calculating the costs of single tasks. TCs were distinguished 
in ex ante negotiation costs (up to the date of signing the agreement), and ongoing TCs. They 
find total costs to be £ 464/ha. Negotiation costs amounted up to £ 163/ha on average; the 
annual ongoing costs amounted up to £ 81/ha. Variances re not indicated. Overall, they find 
the lower the negotiation costs, the more standardised the agreement is. This highlights the 
influence of scheme standardisation on ex ante TCs. 
Beckmann et al. (2003) investigate public and private TCs in an analysis with respect to 
differences between the whole-farm AES “organic farming” and an accumulation of several 
plot-specific AES intended to have the same ecological effect. The sample consisted of 16 
farmers  each  from  two  German  states,  Baden-Wuerttemberg  and  Thuringia.  A  semi-
standardised questionnaire was used to collect information about time and financial effort of 
farmers on specified scheme implementation-related activities (ex post interviews). Results 4 
show that farmers in Baden-Wuerttemberg
1 spent 19.6 hrs./year (range: 1.5-62.5 hrs./year) on 
obtaining  information.  Organic  farmers  spent fewer hours on average  than conventional 
farmers. For the formal application for the schemes, they found a mean of 9.6 hrs./year for all 
farmers, but effort for conventional farmers  is  lower. At the stage of implementation, 
documentation  effort  ranges  from  12.5  hrs./year  from  participants  of  a  grassland 
extensification scheme to 19  hrs./year for arable farmers .  This  study provides the most 
detailed insights on TCs at the scheme implementation stage so far. However, presumably due 
to the small sample size, only descriptive insights are given. 
Mettepenningen et al. (2009) measured private TCs in AES in 10 European regions with 
a survey and a one-year registration (“follow-up”) system. The total sample number is 1,318 
respondents to the survey, and 156 farmers in the follow-up. The follow-up findings shows 
mean search costs (across all regions) of 11.10 €/ha (s.d. 54.2, 0-700.8), negotiation costs of 
15.30 €/ha (s.d. 44, 0-396), monitoring and control costs of 10.60 €/ha (s.d. 14.1, 0-138.6) and 
some not further specified TCs of 3.30€/ha (s.d. 14.1, 0-125). Private TCs accounts for 25.4% 
of the premium on average. Basing on the same data, Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck 
(2009) use linear regression models to identify possible influencing factors on each particular 
type of TCs. Results show overall regional differences, but in general search costs are lower 
the more professional the training obtained by farmers is, and higher the larger the area under 
contract is and the more specific the investments are that had to be done. Negotiation costs 
depend upon the type of AES and are highly positively correlated with search costs. They are 
also  higher  the  larger  the  area  under  contract  is.  Monitoring  and  enforcement  costs  are 
negatively correlated to the age of the farm head, to a higher household income, and to the 
amount of advice obtained from the administration but positively correlated to the number and 
type  of  AES.  Furthermore,  they  state  a  positive  relationship  between  all  types  of  TCs. 
However, results are not clearly differentiated for the various measures, and the goodness of 
fit of the models is rather low. This may be as the most influencing factor on farmers‟ TCs is 
the country and region in which the participating farmers are located, representing different 
institutional surroundings. 
This overview shows that the methodology and quality of defining private TCs and the 
depth and collecting data necessary for calculation have constantly improved. Furthermore, it 
shows  that  the  statements  of  transaction  cost  theory  also  hold  in  an  agri-environmental 
context. However, variances within the same schemes have not been investigated thoroughly. 
Furthermore,  the  origin  of  TCs,  i.e.  whether  they  are  incurred  upon  the  farmers‟  own 
decisions or are compulsory by scheme regulation, has not been taken into account. 
4.  Theoretical Frame and Hypotheses 
4.1 Background 
The concept of TCs was founded by (Coase, 1937) to explain the choice of different 
governance modes at executing different transactions. TCs are “resource losses incurred due 
to  imperfect  information”  (Dahlman,  1979:148)  along  the  whole  process  of  transacting. 
Search and information costs have to be incurred by transaction partners in order to overcome 
the gap of information on possible transaction partners; bargaining costs have to be incurred 
in order to overcome lacking knowledge on the terms of trade; and monitoring costs have to 
be incurred in order to secure correct transacting ex post. Thus TCs are also resources to be 
spent in order to overcome informational gaps (Dahlman, 1979). This functional interpretation 
of  TCs  is  the  foundation  of  this  analysis;  TCs  are  costs  intentionally  spent  on  time  and 
resource-consuming tasks in transactions. 
According to (Williamson, 1985), the amount of TCs to be incurred in order to carry out 
a transaction depends largely upon the nature of a transaction. He relates this nature of the 
                                                           
1 Results for Thuringia were not that detailed. 5 
transaction to particular coordination mechanisms, with market and firm as extremes along an 
axis and various forms of cooperation in between (Williamson, 1985). In latter work, he took 
additional factors, such as the behaviour of the transactors and the institutional environment 
into account when investigating TC-influencing factors (Williamson, 2003). Regarding the 
amount of TCs, one coordination mechanism may be efficient compared to another, but TCs 
are only reduced and not extinguished (Williamson, 2003). 
The informational gaps described above do not only require effort to be minimised but 
also  enable  transaction  partners  to  act  opportunistically,  i.e.  to  realise  additional  rents 
(Williamson, 1998). According to the principal agent theory, information asymmetry exists at 
the expense of the principal (Laffont and Tirole, 1993), which in this context is represented by 
the  CAA  (Mettepenningen  and  van  Huylenbroeck,  2009).  The  agent  (here  the  farmer)  is 
supposed to use private information to generate an extra rent. As the CAA does not know his 
actual  production  costs,  he  might  make  a  claim  for  higher  payments,  resulting  in 
overcompensation (adverse selection, i.e agreement on a suboptimal contract). After contract 
signing,  information  gaps  inhibit  the  administration‟s  monitoring  of  the  farmers‟  actions 
completely.  Farmers  may  apply  for  payment  without  complying  with  the  management 
prescriptions. In the case of prearranged payments, the agent may generate an extra rent due 
to the difference of his costs (effort) and the amount of the payment (moral hazard) (Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993). The possibility of rent-seeking increases transaction costs for both contract 
partners:  the  administration  must  design  regulations  which  prevent  farmers  from  non-
compliance,  and  farmers  might  need  to  make  an  extra  effort  to  prove  compliance  with 
documentation requirements, accepting this delegation of control. As these costs are part of 
scheme implementation on farms, they are further referred to as implementation costs. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
These considerations show that – within the fixed setting of analysis – famers have to 
spend  transaction  costs  to  participate  in  the  scheme.  Spending  on  TCs  is  a  (necessary) 
decision by the farmers to overcome informational gaps. Thus farmers conduct such tasks that 
help achieve their goal. Prior to contract signing (ex ante), farmers can decide autonomously 
which and how many TC-inducing activities they conduct. Ex post TC-inducing activities are 
prescribed by scheme regulations but can be anticipated by the farmer. Thus farmers‟ TCs can 
be regarded as “costs of participation.” As participation is voluntary, it can be assumed that 
farmers benefit from participation. As farmers have to spend participation costs, the amount 
of TC spent can be assumed to be “willingness to participate.” Differences in spending may 
occur, as the personal value (or utility) of this benefit might be different among farmers. 
Farmers‟ interest in participating in the SSGES is likely to stem from several motives. 
Farmers might have an interest in nature conservation (Wilson and Hart, 2000). Thus farmers 
with a higher interest in this derive a higher utility from participation and are willing to spend 
more on participation costs. 
Farmers also may have an interest in AES participation due to economic motives (Wilson 
and Hart, 2000). Participation might be interesting as an additional source of farm income, 
e.g. when farm income is the main source of income, at farms run on a full-time basis or large 
farms. Thus farmers with a high dependency on farm income may derive a higher utility from 
participation and would be willing to spend more on participation costs. 
Additionally, farmers might be interested in „secure‟ income possibilities to reduce risks 
from  volatile  market  good  production.  These  farmers  therefore  may  also  derive  a  higher 
utility  from  participation  and  would  be  willing  to  spend  more  participation  costs. 
Furthermore,  financial  need  for  additional  income  may  stem  from  their  general  business 
situation: a high degree of dependency on public support may increase the need for income, 
resulting  in  higher  spending  of  TCs.  The  underlying  business  decision  to  run  a  farm  in 
accordance  with  organic  farming  prescriptions  may  also  be  important  for  the  decision  to 
spend TCs. 6 
Furthermore, farmers may have interest in participation because of rent-seeking motives 
(Quillérou  et  al.,  2010).  If  participation  for  farmers  is  possible  without  significant 
management changes, the premium would have the effect of a windfall gain. Thus farmers 
with low opportunity costs would spend less on TCs. 
Farmers might also strategically spend TCs in order to participate at an „optimal‟ level, 
realising additional rents. Thus the spending of TCs could be connected with a higher contract 
output, i.e. an increase of the premium by negotiating for additional EVSS, for a larger share 
of mowing agreement or an increased share of contract area or number of plots. 
Finally, socio-economic factors such as age or degree of education or training might 
influence the interest in participation in this actual scheme. 
For each source of motivation, variables were constructed either out of the direct answers 
of the questionnaire (most of the nominal variables) or by calculation from information from 
the questionnaire and the contract. To meet the conditions of normality, some metric variables 
are expressed in their natural logarithm. 
5.  Methodology and Data Base 
Single TC-inducing tasks were identified from previous studies and adjusted to the actual 
scheme  by  examining  the  regulations  and  with  the  help  of  CAA  staff.  Based  upon  that 
information,  a  questionnaire  was  designed  that  contained  questions  on  quantitative  and 
qualitative data (nominal as well as metric scale measurement). 
The  questionnaire  contained  6  major  thematic  sections  to  obtain  information  on  the 
characteristics of the contract area, on the motivation for participation, on contract details, and 
on changes in production and resulting opportunity costs. The most important part aimed to 
gather the quantitative information on additional time and financial effort imposed by scheme 
participation. Data was requested for the first year of participation. Costs for information and 
negotiation  were  regarded  as  on-point  ex  ante  costs  (McCann  et  al.,  2005);  effort  on 
implementation (ex post costs) was extrapolated on the total programme duration (see below). 
The last two sections of the questionnaire contained information on farm structure, business 
indicators, and socio-economic characteristics of the farm head. The single tasks are depicted 
in Table 1. Tasks set in italics indicate prescription by the scheme regulations. Information on 
time effort was requested as a discrete statement. Financial costs for telephone calls were left 
out, as most farmers have flat rate agreements with their phone companies. Postal charges 
were also left out, as they would only occur once at submitting the application by mail and 
amount only about 2 €. 
Data collection was done in a one-point cross-sectional approach using a representative 
number of farmers. Total sample size is 29. Data was gathered ex post, as the aim was to 
calculate the actual, and not the expected effort. Although some difficulties exist, as farmers 
may not recall their actual effort correctly (McCann et al., 2005), the method is supposed to 
deliver robust results as shown above. Farmers were selected from two counties in Hesse 
(Vogelsbergkreis,  Wetteraukreis).  To  capture  all  upcoming  TCs,  only  farmers  could  be 
selected who had at least participated for one complete year within the contract. To check for 
distortions in TCs due to different management prescriptions, the contract had to refer to the 
specified habitat type of hay meadows. Farmers were addressed either via data from the CAA 
or via the snowball system. The face-to-face interviews (60-90 minutes) took place in April 
and May 2010 on the farms. The questionnaire was filled out by the interviewer. The pre-test 
contained 5 farmers (16% of total sample). Contract details were directly collected from the 
contract,  business  indicators  from  the  tax  records.  Table  2  shows  the  description  of  the 
sample. 
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Table 1: Specified tasks for data collection. Tasks set in italics indicate prescription by the scheme regulations. 
 
As the first step in data analysis, the amount of contract payment had to be calculated by 
the researcher, as the payment is not specified in the contract. Calculations for one year were 
done upon the contract details (basic premium/ha and EVSS/Site/ha in accordance with the 
kind of agreement). It was taken into account that farms run under the “organic farming” –
programme only receive the difference between the per-ha-payment in organic farming and 
the SSGES payment. Thus, a basic payment of 160€/ha (HMULV, 2009) was subtracted in 
contracts of organic farmers. The calculated payment was multiplied by 5 according to the 
contract  duration.  To  calculate  TCs,  data  concerning  the  single  tasks,  their  frequency, 
duration, and kilometres driven by the farmers were entered into an EXCEL spreadsheet. 
Time  effort  was  first  calculated  for  the  single  tasks  and  subsumed  afterwards  under  the 
different kinds of TCs. Time effort was monetarised by multiplication with the average wage 
rate of 16.86€/hour for agricultural workers. The wage rate was derived from the net wage 
rate  and  an  additional  70%  for  ancillary  wage  costs,  as  stated  by  the  Association  for 
Technology  and  Structures  in  Agriculture  (KTBL,  2008:717).  Transportation  costs  were 
calculated upon the reported kilometres driven, multiplied by 0.30€/km as practiced in tax 
purposes. 
The content of the questionnaires and the results (in terms of time and money) from 
calculations  were  entered  in  PASW.  Annually  upcoming  implementation  costs  were 
extrapolated into the future by multiplication of the first year costs by the contract duration of 
five  years.  Costs  likely  to  occur  only  once  during  the  contract  period,  but  regarded  as 
implementation costs due to their character, were divided by 5 and thus distributed as a 20% 
share  on  each  year  of  the  contract  period.  Control  costs  were  treated  similarly  when 
Step in implementation process  Effort for specified tasks 
Information 
Time effort: 
- on internet search, 
- on official or professional press 
- on information meetings from CAA 
- on private consultancy 
- tasks to other farmers 
- on meetings with officials in the CAA 
- on telephone calls with the CAA 
- on calculation of profit margins 
Travel expenses   
Negotiation 
Time effort: 
- on choice of contract plots 
- to get permission by the landowner 
- meetings and telephone calls on negotiation with CAA 
- to fill in and  
- submitting the application 
- to make corrections in case of mistakes at application 
Contract Adjustments and 
Documentation/Monitoring 
Time effort: 
- for adjustments on changes in farm-specifics:  time effort on 
calculation of new profit margins, meetings/calls with CAA due to 
contract adjustments, own effort, travel expenses 
- for keeping the field and pasturing log for each business year (9 
months) 




- for control visits and post-processing 
Financial effort due to sanctions 8 
occurring
2. TCs and other metric variables  were transformed into the natural logarithm  in 
order to meet the normality conditions . As the sample number of 29 only allowed limited 
statistical methods, nominal variables were tested by one-factor ANOVAs. Discrete variables 
were  correlated by one -tail  Pearson‟s  correlation.  Dependent  variables  were  the  natural 
logarithm of the particular TC of the whole contract period. TCs per contract were chosen 
instead of TC/ha, as the number of ha to be contracted is not clear until the actual signing. 
Thus ex ante costs have to be spent without regarding the scope of contract area. To keep 
results comparable, TCs/contract were also chosen as dependent variables for implementation 
costs. 
 
Table 2: Description of the sample 
 
6.  Results 
6.1 Descriptive Results 
Results  from  summarising  task-related  activities  are  presented  in  Table  3:  They  are 
indicated as TCW (mere working hours) and TC (TCW plus travel expenses). Descriptive 
results show that the amount of total TCs is substantial. A comparison of the first year costs 
and the total contract period shows that a digressive effect occurs over time, indicating the 
share of the fix costs on information and negotiation. The results also show that despite the 
fixed setting large variances in the individual TCs persist. 
   
                                                           
2 65.5% of the sample farms had been inspected in previous years. Effort for farmers only occurs when non-
compliance is stated. This applied to only 3 farms. However, inspection costs were included. 
  mean  min/max 
Farm size  136.10 ha  4.63 – 410 ha 
Arable land  49.92 ha  0-300 ha 
Grassland  86.34 ha  4.63-250 ha 
Suckler cow husbandry    37,9%    
Dairy farming     31%   
Arable farming     13.8%    
Others  17.2%   
Organic farmers  31%    
Fulltime run farms  69%    
Age farmer                                    48.7 yrs.  30-76 yrs.  
Sex of farm head:               male  89.7%     
female  10.3% 
  Farmers' training level:   None  37.9%     
Traineeship  13.8% 
  Advanced training/foreman  31.0% 
  University degree  17.2% 
  Size of contract plots  1.75 ha  0.47 – 4.5 ha 
Altitude   423m  120-670 m 
Scope of contract  30 ha  3.46 -115.49 ha 
Total number of plots /contract   18  4-148 
Contract area/total grassland  41.0%  3-100% 
Both agreements  41.1%    
Scope EVSS/contract  92.0%    9 
Table 3: Total TCs of farmers in scheme participation 
  First year  Total contract period 
  s.d.    s.d 
TCW/contract (hrs.)  28.9     25.06  82.9   98.62 
TC/contract  (€)  527.10.   432.70  1440.48.  1667.44 
TCW/premium (€)  0.16   0.2  0.09   0.15 
TC/premium (€)  0.17   0.21  0.09   0.15 
TCW/ha contract area (€)  30.63  46.94  91.96  202.46 
TC/ha contract area (€)  33.85  48.63  95.33  202.82 
TCW/plot (€)  46.64  51.56  128.41  172.91 
TC/plot (€)  51.87  57.66  133.98  176.23 
Info costs/contract (€) 
    Negot. costs/contract (€) 













Information costs (%)  40.7  24.6  24.6  23.4 
Negotiation costs (%)  27.5  19.7  15.0  13.6 
Implementation costs (%)  31.8  22.4  60.5  27.1 
 
6.2 Results on influences of motives 
The results on the particular types of TCs are presented separately in  Table 4. First, 
results show that farmers who participate due to an interest in nature conservation spend more 
on TCs at every stage of scheme delivery. This indicates a potential higher “willingness to 
participate.” Second, it is obvious that variables from all identified motivational categories are 
significant, but with very different emphasis and in different composition along the contract 
process. This requires a closer look: 
Information Costs 
Regarding information costs, variables with reference to the agricultural income as main 
income source are significant: Farmers who manage large farms, organic farms, and/or run 
their farms full-time, and those who have a long-term business horizon spend more effort on 
information  gathering.  In  line  with  TCE,  farmers  who  face  high  opportunity  costs  when 
participating in the scheme invest more on previous information. This finding is corroborated 
by the negative correlation of the altitude of contract plots (indicating increasing marginal 
productivity) with information effort. Interestingly, effort on information gathering is also 
higher when farmers state fewer alternative use options for the contract plots. Thus windfall 
gains are likely to be attempted by farmers. 
Variables that refer to strategic spending in order to obtain better contract conditions 
show no significance except for a negative correlation of the share of contracted grassland and 
costs spent on information. This can be interpreted as confirmation of the fixed-cost nature of 
information costs. 
Finally, the amount of schooling as well as of farmers‟ training is positively connected to 
the willingness to spend money on information. This result is no surprise, as people that are 
more educated are likely to be more interested in information on further management options. 
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Table 4: Results of ANOVAs and correlations on the different Types of TCs 
Negotiation Costs 
At the stage of applying and negotiating contract details, results show a rather different 
picture.  Significant  results  of  financial  motives  show  a  strong  influence  of  variables, 
indicating  a  dependency  on  subsidies  as  well  as  income  stabilisation.  Farmers  who  face 
annual  variances  in  market  commodity  outcome  spend  more  effort  on  negotiating  than 
farmers  with  stable  production.  This  is  corroborated  by  the  influence  of  the  farm  focus: 
Farmers with a business focus on animal husbandry spend more on negotiation activities. The 
prevalence  of  a  „financial  need‟  as  motive  to  invest  in  negotiation  is  supported  by  the 
significant results of contract output-indicating variables. Higher negotiation costs seem to 
result in a premium/ha as well as a higher share of grazing agreements (implying a higher 
basic premium) in the contract agreement. Variables on possible windfall gain motives show 
mixed results; on the one hand, farmers who face low opportunity costs when participating in 
the  scheme  invest  less  on  bargaining,  thus  indicating  no  special  interest  in  the  contract 











Interest in nature conservation (y/n)  5.04/4.44*   4.67/3.93*   6.43/5.26*   
Organic farming (y/n)  5.39/4.52**   4.61/4.25   5.57/6.11    
Fulltime farm (y/n)  5.06/4.19**  4.46/4.14    6.43/4.87**   
Ln total farm size (ha)  0.612****  -0.029   0.211 
Long-term business horizon (y/n)  5.05/4.27**  4.28/4.57      6.11/5.87      
Farm focus                          Dairy: 
(3 most prevalent)            Suckler: 










Volatility in production (y/n)  5.08/4.59    4.91/3.39**   6.61/5.47*   
Volatility in market revenue  (y/n)  5.00/4.85    4.40/4.61    6.15/5.86  
Financial motives for participation (y/n)  4.80/4.78  4.31/4.45      6.37/5.01**  
Subsidies CAP/ total revenue (%)  -0.071   0.427**  0.063 
Sum of indicated management changes  0.489****  0.348**   0.285* 
Ln altitude of contract plots (m a.s.l)  -0.357**  0.325**  -0.214 
Alternative land use options/ contract plots (%)  -0.247*  0.232  0.056 
Assumed high reversal costs (y/n)  4.86/4.73  4.25/4.43    5.67/6.17 
Ln total premium     0.031   0.234   0.371*** 
Ln total premium/ha
a) (n=20)
b)  -0.038    0.716****    0.272 
Ln contract area/ total grassland   -0.278*  -0.048   0.167 
Ln number of plots under contract   0.148  -0.043   0.273* 
Ln weighed Sum of EVSS  -0.044   0.043   0.157 
Grazing agreement/contract    0.107   0.395**   0.284* 
Age of farm head (yrs.)  0.027  -0.063  -0.104 
School education                            8 yrs 
                                                      10 yrs 










Farmers' training degree               None 
                                            Traineeship 
                                               Advanced 













p*= 0,1; p**=0,05; p***=0,01; p****=0,00 
a) Per ha premiums were correlated to the particular TCs per ha to identify direct input/output relationships.
 
b) Note that only premiums of conventional farms could be used due to the differences in premium calculation between 
conventional and organic farmers. 11 
costs,  indicating  rent-seeking  motives.  Despite  the  yet  extensive  land  use  due  to  limited 
productivity, higher premiums, possibly exceeding production costs, may be aspired by the 
farmers. Farmers‟ education shows no influence. 
Implementation Costs 
At  the  stage  of  implementation,  a  significant  positive  correlation  exists  between 
implementation costs and total farm size. Farmers who participate due to financial interest 
spend more effort on contract implementation, as well as farmers who face annual variances 
in market commodity outcome. Implementation costs also correlate positively with farmers‟ 
opportunity costs. Regarding the category of output indicators, a higher total  premium,  a 
higher share of grazing agreement, and the number of plots under contract  are positively 
correlated with implementation effort. 
7.  Discussion 
The findings show, that different categories of motivation lie behind farmers‟ willingness to 
spend  transaction  costs.  Surprisingly,  their  particular  influence  varies  along  the  different 
stages of scheme delivery. 
At  the  stage  of  information  gathering,  farmers  seem  to  be  strongly  influenced  by  the 
characteristics  of  their  business  and  its  meaning  as  source  of  income.  The  structure  of 
prevalent  farm  characteristics  for  spending  TCs  also  implies  a  certain  necessity  for 
„professional management‟. The more important the farm revenue as source of income is, the 
more willing farmers are to spend time on information possibilities offered by the AES. As 
information costs have to be spent prior to contract specification and signing, and as output 
related  spending  seems  to  play  no  role  at  this  stage,  effort  on  information  costs  can  be 
interpreted as an initial investment (sunk costs), and as a necessary part of general business 
management.  Spending  on  information  gathering  seems  to  be  more  important  the  more 
„professional‟ the farm business is run. 
At  the  stage  of  negotiation,  financial  output-improving  motives  are  most  prevalent.  Thus 
negotiation effort may be interpreted in two ways. First, pure rent-seeking motives could 
prevail and imply that farmers act strategically and exploit loop-holes in contract regulations 
in the sense of adverse selection. However, basic premiums offered to farmers are rather low. 
Thus it is more likely that farmers try to increase their payment by additional negotiating. 
However, negation costs seem to have a substantial strategic function. 
At  the  stage  of  implementation,  farm  characteristics  indicating  income  maintenance  and 
contract output specifications are prevalent. However, interpretation of this result has to be 
done with respect to TC-determining activities, which are mainly the compulsory keeping of 
the field log and, in case of a grazing agreement, the additional grazing records, and the post-
processing of control visits. The farmer can anticipate these implementation costs prior to 
participation.  The  amount  of  paperwork  is  positively  linked  to  the  scope  and  kind  of 
agreement,  resembling  the  contract  output  details.  The  tasks  serve  as  documentation  of 
farmers‟ compliance with management prescriptions and their entitlement for payment. As 
farmers  are  largely  obligated  to  state  their  own  compliance,  the  willingness  to  spend 
implementation  costs  can  be  interpreted  as  an  expression  of  willingness  to  comply  as  a 
necessary obligation to enhance income maintenance. 
8.  Conclusion 
The analysis shows that variances between farmers‟ TC expenses can be explained by 
different  motivational  factors.  Spending  on  TCs  as  “costs  of  participation”  is  a  result  of 
farmer-specific intentions. Different motives are prevalent at the various stages of scheme 
participation. Results also show that the actual amount of TCs may not be the prevalent factor 
in scheme participation, as a large part of TCs are spent voluntarily in order to realise gains 
from transaction. Thus, a general reimbursement of farmers‟ TCs by the public seems not to 12 
be appropriate. If offered, a reimbursement should only refer to scheme-related, obligatory 
TCs. 
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